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ABSTRACT 
The Officer Data Card (ODC) is an automated record that provides up-to-date 
data about U.S. Navy officers for use in detailing and promotion boards.  Policy 
regarding ODCs requires controlled access and dissemination of ODC information. A 
better understanding of the policies associated with ODCs could allow current 
technologies to be employed to support their use and management. This work builds a 
model for ODC dissemination based on current policies and practices. A process model is 
built to describe controlled dissemination of ODCs during specific promotion board 
processes.  It is found that the dissemination policies and model for ODCs have a strong 
similarity to those applied to ORCON-labeled information handled by the intelligence 
community. With the threat of unauthorized dissemination of ODCs in mind, a 
blockchain solution is proposed for auditing the access to and modification of ODCs. The 
proposed solution is a distributed auditing mechanism that does not rely on a central 
auditing server. The proposed blockchain solution is analyzed and determined to be able 
to provide accountability for record handling processes and ODC dissemination but does 
not provide enough new functionality or efficiency beyond that possible through 
intensive central audit logging. 
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The Officer Data Card (ODC) is an automated record that provides up-to-date 
data about U.S. Navy officers for use in detailing and promotion boards. Policy regarding 
ODCs requires controlled access and dissemination to ODC information. Because ODCs 
are used in various U.S. Navy personnel processes and contain the personal data of the 
officer, they should reflect the most current and accurate data of the officer. While there 
are overarching policies regarding the use and handling of personnel record information 
in general, ODCs are handled and used in unique ways for promotion boards and other 
specific processes. 
Blockchain technology has gathered the immense interest of cybersecurity 
researchers, companies and organizations seeking new, potentially disruptive 
technologies to improve their cybersecurity posture. A possible application of blockchain 
technology is in the handling of U.S. Navy personnel records. This work explores the 
policies related to ODCs and investigates the merit of blockchain technology in the 
context of promotion boards and discusses how blockchain technology could be used as 
part of an audit mechanism to support policies related to ODC dissemination.  
A. OBJECTIVES 
There are two primary objectives of this work. The first is to build a model for 
ODC dissemination during the process of statutory promotion boards for U.S. Navy 
officers. No model describing the access control policy for this process exists. This work 
aims to take governing guidelines, policies, procedures, and best practices and create a 
technical model for access control for personnel records during the process of statutory 
promotion boards when records need to be corrected. 
The second objective is to provide a useful case study of a possible application 
blockchain technology. Given the lack of proven use cases for blockchain technology, 
this work aims to build a blockchain solution as an auditing mechanism in support of 
policy enforcement of ODC access and dissemination. Building a blockchain solution 
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will permit critical analysis of the use of blockchain technology within the context of 
record keeping and audit logging in support of ODC access and dissemination policies. 
B. RELEVANCE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The Department of Defense (DoD) strives to maintain a critical military 
advantage and stay on the cutting edge of technologies. Information assurance and 
cybersecurity are two categories of research and development that the DoD is interested 
in and provides funding for the research and development. Personnel record information, 
including the ODC, is required by governing authorities and policies to have access and 
dissemination control [1]. In 2017, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018 was passed and included funding for the cyber application of blockchain 
technology [2]. Accountability policies pertain to the linkage between individuals or 
groups of individuals and the processes that act on their behalf. An essential requirement 
for accountability is a reliable audit mechanism. One potential avenue for blockchain 
applications within the DoD is to use blockchain technology as an audit mechanism to 
support accountability policy enforcement of personnel record information. Blockchain 
technology can provide integrity to an audit mechanism which can be used to hold users 
accountable while handling and maintaining ODCs and other personnel record 
information. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This work consists of five chapters: Introduction (Chapter I), Background and 
Existing Work (Chapter II), Personnel Record Management Scenarios (Chapter III), 
Threat Model (Chapter IV), ODC Orcon Process Model (Chapter V), Blockchain Use 
Case Analysis (Chapter VI), and Conclusion (Chapter VII). 
Chapter I outlines the problem and states the objectives of this work. It provides 
an overview of the motivation, objectives, and benefits to DoD of the research conducted. 
Finally, it describes the overall flow of the work and its organization. 
Chapter II briefly covers three topics: U.S. Navy personnel records, originator 
controlled access control, and blockchain technology. The personnel record system 
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section provides a brief overview of the record management process within the DoD and 
introduces the ODC, a record of specific interest to this work. The Orcon section gives a 
brief history of originator control over information distribution and provides a small 
example of its usage. The blockchain section gives a brief history of the new technology 
and defines characteristics of blockchain technology as they relate to this work.  
Chapter III discusses the processes used in promotion boards for active duty 
officers in the U.S. Navy. We discuss the specifics of record handling within the context 
of statutory promotion boards. Finally, we construct two scenarios for the handling and 
modification of ODCs within the context of statutory promotion boards. The intent of the 
chapter is to reduce the problem space to working scenarios for use in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter IV defines a threat model to ODC usage during the promotion board 
process defined in Chapter III. We evaluate the critical security aspects, i.e., 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, of ODCs during the board process, and 
evaluate the ability of adversaries to degrade those assets. The intent of the chapter is to 
determine a most relevant threat to ODC policy and processes for use in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter V builds a model for originator controlled access control for the scenarios 
constructed in Chapter III. The model tracks user and group access to specific records 
through the process of admitting new records into a promotion board as a result of 
incorrect or incomplete information provided at the beginning of the process. The intent 
of the chapter is to document the process for access control for ODCs within the 
promotion board process. 
Chapter VI builds a blockchain solution to act as an audit mechanism model and 
attempts to counter an aspect of the defined threat modeled in Chapter IV. We conclude 
with an analysis of the blockchain solution and give recommendations for 
implementation and testing. The intent of the chapter is to explore the utility of 
blockchain technology within the context of controlled distribution of information. 
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Chapter VII concludes and summarizes the entirety of the work, and provides 
recommendations for future research to advance the knowledge and development of 
blockchain technology further. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND EXISTING WORK 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of three topics that serve as 
the basis for this work. We start with a discussion on the personnel record management 
system for officers in the United States Navy. An introduction, history, and brief 
discussion of blockchain technology will then follow. Finally, an introduction to 
Originator Controlled (Orcon) dissemination is provided. 
A. NAVY PERSONNEL RECORDS 
All active duty U.S. Navy officers carry official records of their military careers. 
An ODC summarizes these records. The ODC serves as a single document that is the 
collection of the records of the U.S. Navy officer. 
The ODC is generated by querying the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) 
web interface [3]. BUPERS is an organization that serves to provide administrative 
leadership, policy planning, and general oversight of the Navy Personnel Command 
(PERS) [4]. Multiple databases that store individual records for a U.S. Navy officer 
connect to the BUPERS web interface. Querying these databases generates the ODC, 
extracting information necessary to fill all blocks in the ODC. There are a total of five 
offices in three locations where all subsidiary information is stored. Appendix E of 
NAVPERS 15839I details the specific offices that have ownership of, and are queried for 
information, of all blocks in the ODC [5]. The Navy Standard Integrated Personnel 
System (NSIPS) aggregates the necessary data from these offices to create an ODC. 
Figure 1 shows a portion of an ODC, as generated by the BUPERS web interface. 
1. Record Types 
There are a total of 110 blocks of information in the ODC. Examples of the 
information contained in the ODC for each U.S. Navy officer are personally identifiable 
information, education records, and information about dependents associated with the 
officer. The Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications, Volume 
II, The Officer Data Card details the exact information for all blocks in the ODC [5]. The 
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ODC does not contain all of the involved records in their entirety. Instead, only the 
necessary information is aggregated from the required records to generate the block of 
the ODC. 
 
Figure 1. Example ODC 
2. Construction of Underlying Database 
ODCs are generated online through the BUPERS website [3]. Records are kept as 
original physical documents, scanned electronic copies, or digitally signed electronic 
copies, depending on the record. It is the responsibility of the officer, who acts as a 
trusted agent, to keep either the original or a copy of all records. This redundancy allows 
the officer to generate a new copy of a record, should it be missing from the database of 
each record holding office, or if the information reported by the office is incorrect. 
Verification of records is described in the Navy Personnel Command Electronic 
Submission Standard Operating Procedures (e-Sub SOP), Version 2.0 [6]. If the officer is 
not a trusted agent for a particular document, the officer must contact the trusted agent for 
the document and have the trusted agent provide a copy of the record on the officer’s 
 7 
behalf [6]. Complete details of the assignment of trusted agents are designated in the 
Navy Personnel Database (NPDB). 
3. Digital Record Storage 
Records are kept in multiple places and exist as either an original hard copy or an 
authentic, replicated digital copy. A single record is held by the originator of the record, 
the office that stores the record for use in a Navy officer’s ODC, and may optionally be 
held personally by the Navy officer. Each record is stored in the Electronic Military 
Personnel Record System (EMPRS) at its designated digital storage location. Appendix E 
of NAVPERS 15839I [5] associates a record to the office that owns the record [7]. 
4. Record Access and Maintenance 
ODCs are generated by BUPERS and are viewed by the U.S. Navy Officer, as 
well as personnel involved in detailing and selection boards for that officer. A Navy 
officer’s ODC is available to view at any time online, and hard copies of an ODC can be 
generated, downloaded, and printed as well. Some of the ODC fields do not change 
throughout the officer’s career, some are changed or appended to, and some fields are 
generated in the ODC at specific milestones in the officer’s career. Examples of the last 
are rank, qualifications, and milestones during the officer’s career. 
Once the officer is discharged from military service, the records are retained in an 
archival database. Current U.S. Navy officers have their records transferred to the 
National Military Personnel Records Center (NPRC), in St. Louis, Missouri [8]. Access 
to these records by the veteran or next-of-kin at this point can only be obtained by filling 
out a Standard Form 180 (SF-180). The general public can also view redacted records 
under rules and guidelines of the Freedom of Information Act [9]. 
5. Record Usage 
Personnel records are used for promotion, selection boards, billeting, pay, and 
benefits, and are run through the offices of the Navy Personnel Command and NSIPS. 
The Commander of Navy Personnel Command (CNPC) owns the ODC. A U.S. Navy 
officer can view his or her ODC and can request updates to the ODC. Detailers who work 
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for CNPC can view ODCs and make restricted updates to ODCs. The Privacy Act of 
1974 and SECNAVINST 5211.5E are the policies that prohibit the unauthorized use or 
disclosure of official record information, including ODCs [1]. 
6. Record Privacy 
Personnel records are protected under the Privacy Act of 1974 [10] because they 
contain personally identifiable information (PII). Records containing PII are marked For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) and therefore fall under the dissemination controls described 
in the Department of Defense Manual 5200.01, Volume 2 [11]. The safeguards 
surrounding the FOUO records involve a heightened measure of access control, requiring 
the use of public key infrastructure (PKI) with a common access card (CAC) for access to 
documents. Specific protocols for the transfer and movement of documents include cover 
sheets for hard copies and encrypted email transmissions. This also includes a model for 
restricted access to the specific records. In addition, policies, procedures, and practices 
dictate robust dissemination controls on ODCs. 
B. ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 
Access controls on computer systems enforce policies to protect information so 
that it is accessible only to those for whom access is authorized. In a computer system, an 
entity will be granted or denied access to an object in the system, based upon rules set in 
place in the system. In many cases, these determinations are made based upon access 
control lists (ACLs) associated with an object in the system. The ACL describes who is 
allowed to have access to the object. There are various categories for access control, each 
describing the unique nature in which the system builds, reads, and interacts with ACLs 
on an object. Originator Controlled (Orcon) Access Control is an information 
dissemination control that is defined as the “dissemination and extraction of information 
controlled by the originator” [12]. Information, in this context, refers to data and data 
objects that have an originator of that specific data. The originator, as referred to in this 
context, is the entity who has ownership of certain information, and has originated a 
document or item such that the originator has control over the handling of the information 
in all capacities, including documents created by others that contain this controlled 
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information. The Orcon dissemination control represents a stringent form of access 
control where minimal information sharing is needed, and a tight chain of information 
flow can be established. ORCON (capitalized) is used by the DoD and intelligence 
communities to “mark information that requires the originator’s consent for further 
dissemination or extraction of information when the classification level and other 
controls alone are insufficient to control dissemination” [11]. ORCON is a special 
dissemination marking on highly classified intelligence information. ODCs do not fall 
into this category, so “Orcon” in the context of this work describes originator-controlled 
information in ODCs. In discussing ODCs, Orcon will be defined simply as the 
dissemination and extraction of information controlled by the originator. 
1. History of ORCON Models 
In 1989, Graubart was one of the first people to think about how ORCON might 
be implemented in a system. The motivation for the implementation of ORCON was the 
insufficient mapping of existing access controls to specific DoD/Intelligence information. 
The two significant access control policies are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC). MAC policies restrict access to information based 
on the sensitivity of the information and the formal authorizations of people. In DoD and 
the U.S. Government, it is enforced by applying sensitivity labels to the information and 
checking a user’s clearance to access information of such sensitivity [13]. DAC is used to 
restrict access to objects based on the identity of subjects or groups to which they belong 
[13]. DAC policies allow for the policy to be modified. DAC utilizes a runtime interface 
for policy modification: changing ACLs or permissions. Often, DAC policies are 
implemented so that UIDs or roles are checked against an ACL. ORCON exists as a way 
to fill a gap needed in access control that could not be adequately solved by MAC, DAC, 
or a combination of the two [14]. McCollum et al. expanded upon this work in 1990, 
developing a policy model for ORCON which would be a strictly enforced control of 
access and specific access modes at an individual user level [15]. ORCON is a unique 
type of access control. MAC and DAC do not satisfy the conditions needed for ORCON 
[14]. This form of access control allows original owners of data to retain control of the 
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data, even after it is propagated, copied, merged, and written by other users who obtained 
access to the data [15]. 
2. ORCON Usage Example 
Figure 2 illustrates the access control that ORCON provides. In Figure 2, part (a), 
Alice creates an object with information that will follow the rules of ORCON. Alice can 
create an access list containing who is able to view the particular object, and who can 
create new objects that contain the ORCON information contained within the object. 
Alice allows Bob to read from and write to OBJ-1. In Figure 2, part (b), Bob creates a 
copy of OBJ-1 and calls it OBJ-2. Bob, instead, could have retyped the contents of OBJ-1 
into a new object OBJ-2, and have complete control over that object; however, he is still 
required to obey the dissemination controls originally applied by Alice. The retyping of 
information is a limitation of computer controls, since it is a process that the system can 
do nothing about. For the purpose of this work, this limitation is not considered. 
 
Figure 2. ORCON Usage Example Diagram. Source: [15]. 
 11 
Bob is the owner of OBJ-2, but this new object is still subject to the access control 
list created by Alice. Bob can create his own access list for his object. In Figure 2, part 
(c), Bob gives Carol read permission for OBJ-2. Under the rules of ORCON, Alice still 
retains ownership of the information in OBJ-2, and her access control still applies to the 
object. Because Carol does not have read access according to Alice’s access control list, 
Carol is not allowed to read the document. In order for Carol to read the document, Alice 
must grant Carol read access to the document. Because Alice controls her access list, only 
she can update it. Bob can update and change his access list, but not Alice’s, so he must 
ask Alice to update her access list to allow Carol to have read access to the object. In 
Figure 2, part (d), Alice updates her access control list for the object, which now gives 
Carol read access to the document. 
C. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
Although the concept of blockchains evolved from work starting in 1980, the first 
well-known instance of its use was by Bitcoin in 2008 [16]. The term blockchain has “no 
standard technical definition but is a loose umbrella term used by various parties to refer 
to systems that bear varying levels of resemblance to Bitcoin and its ledger” [17]. Given 
this, researchers and industry leaders tailor the definition of blockchain to their given 
implementations of the technology. 
For the purposes of this work, blockchain will be defined as a distributed, 
immutable* ledger. Many industry leaders have invested in research on the use of 
blockchain technology because of its potential to solve issues associated with centralized 
systems and bureaucracy [18], [19]. Gartner’s chart in Figure 3 illustrates the emergence 
of new and developing technologies. The figure includes technologies that show promise 
in delivering a competitive advantage to organizations who leverage the technologies 
[20]. Each of these technologies is categorized by their maturity in terms of research done 
to applications built in the industry. Blockchain technology is being considered by 
                                                 
* Blockchains are immutable when all parties participating in a blockchain act in a non-malicious way. 
Blockchains are difficult to change, but are vulnerable to attacks that can change the contents, breaking its 
immutable nature. For the purposes of this work, this vulnerability will not be considered, and all 
participants are assumed to be non-malicious. Immutable, used from this point on, is defined as “essentially 
immutable,” taking into account this vulnerability. 
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organizations as a potential solution for streamlining processes burdened by centralized 
and intermediary organizations, even outside of the financial realm [20]. However, Figure 
3 shows blockchain technology at the peak of inflated expectations because many 
proposed applications have been theorized, but few have been implemented. 
 
Figure 3. Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies (August 2017): Source: [20]. 
1. History and Origin 
“Bitcoin, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” was publicly released in 2008 
[16]. Bitcoin was designed to be a trustless, distributed system that supported currency 
transactions. Bitcoin takes out the financial institution as a middleman for financial 
transactions and is trusted through the application of cryptographic techniques. This 
innovative system, widely known as a cryptocurrency, allows mutually suspicious 
participants to engage in transactions through the use of blockchain technology. The 
Bitcoin whitepaper does not use the term “blockchain,” eluding to the fact that 
blockchain does not have a standard definition, but was a new way to combine distinct 
cryptographic elements to accomplish something new [17]. 
Blockchain technology combines the ideas of linked timestamping and verifiable 
logs, verifiable proofs (e.g., proof-of-work or Byzantine fault tolerance), PKI, and smart 
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contracts [17]. Each implementation of a blockchain is unique but draws upon a collection of 
research advancements and technologies of the last 35 years. Merkle trees, first introduced by 
Ralph Merkle in 1980 [21], are used to create a digest of all of the data items that make up 
each block that will be added to the blockchain. Figure 4 illustrates a Merkle Tree. 
 
Figure 4. Example Merkle Tree. Source: [22]. 
Merkle Trees add only a small footprint to the original data and provide a quick 
method to verify the integrity of each item within the block. Integrity in this context 
means that the value of an item within the block cannot be changed once it has been 
incorporated into the blockchain. Figure 5 illustrates how this forced integrity is 
achieved. 
Work done by Stuart Haber and Scott Sornetta in the 1990s produced linked 
timestamping as a digital notary service that is used as the foundation for the ledgers used 
in blockchain implementations [23], [24]. Research done by Leslie Lamport, Robert 
Shostak, Marshall Pease, Miguel Castro, and Barbara Liskov in the field of state 
replication and fault tolerance in distributed computing allowed for the introduction of 
consensus models for the addition of new blocks appended to a blockchain [25], [26]. 
Blockchain technology has combined these diverse concepts in order to provide a 
mechanism that is new and unique. 
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Figure 5. Blockchain Hash Pointer Usage. Source: [22]. 
2. Blockchain Characteristics and Features 
A definition for blockchain is an “immutable ledger for recording transactions, 
maintained within a distributed network of mutually untrusting peers,” [27]. A record of 
all previous transactions that have ever taken place within the system is recorded on the 
blockchain. Every blockchain has two distinct characteristics. The first reflects its 
availability to new participants. A public blockchain is open to the public and can any 
user can gain access to the blockchain and its ledger to participate in the blockchain in 
some manner. In contrast, a private blockchain requires explicit authorization to 
participate in the blockchain and associated ledger. The second blockchain characteristic 
relates to its permissions. 
A permission-less blockchain grants all users who have access to the blockchain 
authorization to read the blockchain and the ledger, write transactions and build blocks, 
and participate in consensus. A permissioned blockchain can restrict the authorization of 
users to read, write, and participate in consensus. The work presented in this document 
will, from this point forward, use the word “blockchain” to refer to a private 
permissioned blockchain, which will be the type of blockchain used for the case study. 
Three blockchain features are relevant for this work: its distributed nature, its immutable 
nature, and its permissioned access control. 
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a. Distributed Nature 
A benefit of distributed systems is the ability to eliminate single points of failure 
with respect to the execution of a process or the storage of data. Blockchains achieve a 
distributed nature in both of these regards. First, nodes that participate in a blockchain use 
a specific software suite to comply with blockchain’s specific protocols. Each participant 
in a blockchain runs the software based on their permissions to be able to read, write, and 
verify data on that blockchain. Second, redundant copies of the blockchain are 
maintained by each end node in the peer-to-peer network. Each user has an up-to-date 
copy of the history of all previously recorded transactions tied to the particular 
blockchain. This history of transactions is called a ledger. The ledger contains all 
transactions that are recorded on the blockchain. When a person decides to append a new 
transaction to the blockchain, his or her addition is sent to peer nodes that will verify the 
addition as valid, i.e., one that obeys the protocol and does not violate the integrity of any 
previous transaction. These peer nodes then send the transaction to their own peer nodes. 
For each transaction, this process continues until all users have the new changes to the 
blockchain and their ledgers are updated. The changes can also be rejected, at which 
point the transaction is not added to the blockchain and is not reflected in any user’s copy 
of the blockchain. 
Figure 6 shows this distributed nature. Each node participating in the blockchain 
has its own copy of the blockchain. The blockchain is a structured collection of all 
transactions. The contents of the blockchain can be verified and reproduced from the 
contents of the ledger. Nodes communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer network to 
communicate any updates to or verifications of a copy of the blockchain, and edits are 
then reflected in each copy of the blockchain. This is how blockchain technology 
achieves its distributed nature. 
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Figure 6. Distributed Nature of Blockchain 
b. Immutable Nature 
Immutability is a property of an object in which the state of the object cannot be 
modified after it is created. Immutability is achieved in blockchains through the use of 
cryptographic hashes. Using a method to condense a group of items into a single value, 
usually through the use of a Merkle Tree, a series of transactions or items are grouped to 
make a block that is added to the end of the existing blockchain. Blocks can only be 
added to the end of a blockchain, and once added and verified, they should not be 
modified. The new block is cryptographically secured from subsequent modification 
because the state of the current blockchain is used as an ingredient for creating the 
cryptographic hash of the next block. This means that every block contains evidence of 
the state of the blockchain at the time of the new block’s creation. When this effect 
compounds and a block’s position in the blockchain deepens, it becomes very difficult to 
change an already existing transaction [17]. Changing an existing transaction would make 
the block the transaction is a part of, and every block afterward, inconsistent with the 
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cryptographic hash that represents the state of the blockchain, thus invalidating the 
integrity of the blockchain. This is an attribute that can be easily checked. 
Figure 7 illustrates how this chain of cryptographic hashes results in the 
immutability of the blockchain. The state of each block contains not only the content of 
each item (transaction) for the current block but also the hash of the most current block 
that has been established in the blockchain, to create a new hash that will be used by 
future blocks to build upon. 
 
Figure 7. Immutable Nature of Blockchain. Source: [16]. 
c. Permissions 
A permissioned blockchain has a specific mechanism for achieving access 
controls on users’ interactions with the blockchain. This can be accomplished through the 
use of public-key cryptography. This is a simple solution because public key 
cryptography is already a part of blockchain technology as it represents the identity of the 
user participating in the blockchain. Blockchain implementations like Bitcoin that are 
anonymous still use public-key cryptography to link a Bitcoin wallet to transactions. 
Public key cryptography is accomplished through the use of shared public keys and secret 
private keys for authentication and encryption purposes [28]. Permissioned blockchains 
require this authentication at end nodes to permit or deny access to specific features of 
the software managing the blockchain. The software retains the public key for a user and 
his or her associated permissions. When a user authenticates with a private key, he or she 
is allowed to interact with the blockchain as specified by his or her permission level. This 
mechanism allows for access control and privacy of data stored on a blockchain, which is 
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necessary for applications surrounding the use of sensitive information such as personnel 
records. The Department of Defense already has a public key cryptography 
implementation through the use of Common Access Cards (CAC). 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of Navy Personnel Record Management with 
regard to the Officer Data Card, an introduction to Orcon, and a brief explanation of 
blockchain technology. These three subject areas will intersect by creating Officer Data 
Card Orcon dissemination procedures for which blockchain can provide an immutable 
timeline of records with verifiable integrity. This use case is relevant to the study of the 
utility of blockchain technology within the U.S. Navy. The use case will focus on the 
feasibility, usability, benefits, and risks of blockchain solutions to an existing system for 
handling personnel records for U.S. Navy officers. 
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III. PERSONNEL RECORD MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS 
This chapter will focus on scoping Navy personnel record management as a whole 
into specific technical processes involving U.S. Navy officer ODCs and Orcon 
dissemination restrictions. The scenarios are constructed by defining all of their 
requirements, variables and desired outcomes.  
The breadth of record handling processes within the U.S. Navy is vast. In order to 
create meaningful and detailed scenarios, several records were initially considered. Of the 
candidate records, the ODC was the specific record chosen for use in record handling 
situations. When researching dissemination procedures and practices for ODCs, it was 
determined that Orcon was used to control dissemination of ODC information. One 
specific procedure that uses Orcon to control dissemination of ODC information is U.S. 
Navy officer promotion boards. We will first introduce scenarios for recordkeeping 
within the context of promotion boards, including the records, the members who interact 
with the records, and the access controls associated with each member in the process. We 
will then define the scope and boundaries of the specific scenarios. The following 
chapters will develop a technical model to represent the scenarios for record-keeping and 
maintaining Orcon for ODCs during promotion board processes. 
A. OVERVIEW OF PROMOTION BOARD PROCESS 
Navy Personnel Command is responsible for overseeing and conducting 
numerous promotion boards every year. The office responsible for U.S. Navy officer 
promotions is PERS-801, a subset of the Navy Personnel Command, located in 
Millington, TN [29]. Promotion boards are held both for U.S. Navy officers and enlisted 
service members. This work will focus only on U.S. Navy officer promotion boards. 
There are multiple types of promotion boards, each with its own specific governing 
authorities and set of rules, regulations, and guidelines. These guidelines include the 
makeup of board members, eligibility of board candidates, and the criteria for selection. 
However, these boards can generally be divided into two categories. The first category is 
statutory boards. These boards are required by law and governed by the Defense Officer 
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Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) [30]. Statutory boards are held for U.S. Navy 
officers who are being considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Commander 
(O-4) and higher. DOPMA controls the total number of U.S. Navy officers who can hold 
a specific rank [30]. DOPMA is held to a strict standard of procedure and compliance and 
are constrained by governing legislation regarding retention, availability, and budget 
[30]. The second category of boards is an administrative board. These boards are not 
governed by DOPMA and are specific to a warfare community, e.g., surface warfare or 
aviation, based upon the needs and requests of that community. Examples of an 
administrative board are a surface warfare department-head board, an O-5 command 
board, and a major command board. These boards are governed by leaders within their 
respective communities, and their standards and procedures meet specific community 
requirements [31]. 
A U.S. Navy officer is assigned a detailer who is in charge of billeting and who 
manages the officer’s career path, goals, and plans for military service. Detailers are a set 
of people who are able to view the service records of other personnel. Detailers are only 
permitted this special access by nature of their position and must be granted access to the 
BUPERS database by completing a System Authorization Access Request (SAAR-N). 
An individual officer’s service record is viewable by name in a query-based system. This 
permissioned viewing access is given to an individual while serving in the role of detailer 
and is revoked when an individual is no longer a detailer. Even though they have read 
access to personnel records, including PII and HIPAA information, detailers have limited 
ability to modify records. An example of a record modification a detailer may perform is 
the addition of career milestones, e.g., an Officer of the Deck (OOD) Letter. Because of 
the detailers’ permissioned read access to the records and assignment to specific officers, 
they are excluded from the promotion board process. The promotion board must make an 
unbiased evaluation of each U.S. Navy officer.  
Members of a promotion board are selected based upon rank and service 
community and are brought to Millington, TN on Temporary Duty (TDY) orders to serve 
as board members. Figure 8 is a sample memorandum that lists board members who have 
been called upon to sit as members of a board [32]. Because being a board member 
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requires viewing PII or HIPAA information, board members, upon initiation of orders, 
must complete a SAAR-N form, elevating their permission to view records for the 
duration of their orders. 
 
Figure 8. Example Board Membership Memorandum. Source: [32]. 
For a statutory board, there is no contact between detailers and board members. 
This applies to detailers who are assigned to the evaluated officers as well as the board 
member’s own detailer. This restriction is not only a digital restriction, by means of 
electronic communications, but a physical one as well. Detailers reside in the Whitten 
Building on the Navy Personnel Command in Millington, TN and the building for 
promotion boards is adjacent to it. While serving under orders on a promotion board, its 
members are prohibited from entering the Whitten Building for the duration of the TDY 
orders and are prohibited from contact with all detailers for the duration of the orders. 
Likewise, detailers are prohibited from entering promotion board spaces and 
communicating by any means with board members. Board members, in addition to this 
restriction, are prohibited from disclosing the fact that they have been selected as board 
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members until the results of the board have been released. These restrictions on board 
members exist to eliminate outside bias, which could affect the case of a candidate for 
promotion. 
Administrative boards differ from statutory boards in that at specific points within 
the board process, communication among detailers and board members is permitted. For 
an administrative board, detailers are allowed to do a pre-board “record scrub” for 
candidate officers. A record scrub provides an opportunity for communication between 
board members and detailers to give guidance regarding the particular records of interest 
to the board, and for the detailers to reach out to candidate officers to resolve any 
discrepancies in a candidate’s record package [33]. For the purposes of this work, only 
statutory boards will be considered due to their heightened strictness and enforceability of 
procedures for board meetings and board conduct. 
B. RECORD HANDLING IN STATUTORY PROMOTION BOARDS 
Personnel records, as described in detail in Chapter II, are divided into three 
distinct categories: the OMPF, the ODC, and the Officer Summary Record (OSR). These 
three types of military records are stored in separate databases and are accessed through 
separate mainframes and user interfaces. The BUPERS database contains all scanned 
documents associated with a U.S. Navy officer’s personnel file and provides interfaces to 
access and change these documents [33]. Users can access this database of information 
through the use of a CAC, once they have been granted access to the database by means 
of a SAAR-N authorization. Access control is handled by associating an identity via a 
CAC and enforcing access control rules on that identity. A specific set of access control 
rules is determined based on a user’s role within the system, and are stored on database 
systems. A user’s access is associated with those documents he or she is allowed to read, 
append, and edit within the BUPERS database. 
Before a statutory promotion board convenes, personnel records are copied for all 
U.S. Navy officers who are being evaluated in a particular promotion board. This 
typically takes place two weeks before the convening of the board. The copying of data is 
initiated by administrators and IT members who work in the promotion board building. 
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While multiple records are used for each U.S. Navy officer promotion candidate, this 
work will only focus on the use of ODCs during the promotion board process. In the case 
of copying ODCs from the BUPERS database, the ODC copy is in the form of a PDF 
document that represents the most up-to-date ODC that was generated by the BUPERS 
database. 
The promotion board building is segmented into three distinct sections. Figure 9 
shows the segmentation, information flow, and physical access restrictions of the board 
spaces within the building. 
  
Figure 9. Physical and Network Segmentation of Promotion Board Spaces 
The promotion board spaces consist of two networks: an externally-facing 
network, and an internal, isolated network. The administrative spaces are the only portion 
of the building connected to the external-facing network. Administrators have Navy 
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Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) access and can access all necessary databases for records 
from administrative space systems. The copied personnel record information from the 
BUPERS database is stored in the administrative spaces and then distributed to 
workstations in the review spaces. Review spaces are used for individual work where 
board members markup records for each promotion candidate. The tank space is used for 
group work where all board members congregate and deliberate over candidates and 
make decisions to promote or not promote each candidate. The review spaces and tank 
spaces house workstations equipped with consoles that are only connected to the internal, 
isolated network. Personal devices with Internet connectivity are not allowed into the 
building. 
The administrative systems can be connected to the internal network to transfer 
records to the internal network. This process takes place while the review space systems 
are not being used. Any request for additional information during the promotion board 
must be made to an administrator via email or paper request. The administrator will 
retrieve the information via the external network connection. These measures ensure the 
data held in the internal network has limited means for being leaked and that there is no 
use of information other than for the strict purposes of the statutory promotion board. It 
creates a soft air-gap from outside the building to the inside of the building where board 
members operate [33]. 
When the board takes place, the record copies have already been loaded onto the 
workstations in the review spaces. Each board member is assigned a group of candidate 
officers whose records are to be evaluated. When board members evaluate records, they 
use markup language software to add notes and comments to records, appending the 
markup to the underlying records. Because the markup of the records overlays the 
officer’s actual records, the actual contents of the records are not changed by the markup 
process. Even if a record were somehow changed, the records, once in the promotion 
board building, are considered separate and unique from the actual records stored in the 
records databases. The board members may only work with copies of records that never 
go back into the BUPERS database. The marked records are stored locally until the board 
results are announced, at which point they are discarded. 
 25 
After markup of the records has been completed, the marked-up records are 
moved into the tank spaces. Here they are deliberated upon by board members. The 
records are displayed for all board members to see, but records are never edited or 
marked up in tank spaces. After the deliberations in the tank-spaces have concluded, 
specific candidates’ records are discarded because they have been selected or not selected 
for promotion. Only a portion of the eligible candidates is selected for promotion during 
an iteration of deliberations. Board members then return to the review spaces and review 
records of those candidates who were neither selected nor rejected during the iteration. 
They markup records that they previously did not markup, but that a different board 
member had already marked-up. The records are then sent back to the tank spaces for 
deliberation and voting. This process iterates until a sufficient number of officers have 
been selected for promotion as mandated by DOPMA. 
C. STEPS FOR CORRECTING ODC INFORMATION 
1. Determination 
On occasion, when ODCs are initially copied for a given promotion board, there 
are situations in which an ODC may have missing information or may contain incorrect 
information. Under normal circumstances, the two situations are handled differently. 
However, the processes to handle these two situations are the same from the perspective 
of the promotion board process and will be discussed below. 
2. Request 
Both the process of adding missing ODC information and correcting incorrect 
ODC information can be initiated by a member of the promotion board or by the U.S. 
Navy officer being considered for promotion. The process presented here does not apply 
outside the context of promotion boards. The only difference in procedure between the 
two scenarios is in who first requests missing or corrected information. If a board 
member requests the information in question, there is additional overhead at the 
beginning of the process. A request must first be made in order for any new information 
to be admitted into the board. Board members must request the missing information from 
administrative personnel working within the board spaces. The administrative member 
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assigned the task of retrieving the missing information will query the permanent 
databases to ensure no previous error was made. If the queries yield no results, the 
administrative member will then reach out to the officer to attempt to retrieve the 
appropriate information. 
3. Admittance 
At this point, the rest of the procedure for the two scenarios is the same whether 
the admittance of new ODC information is initiated by a board member or by the U.S. 
Navy officer being considered for promotion. The new record to be admitted will be 
provided by the officer. This submission is made by sending an encrypted email 
containing the record that contains the requested information. 
4. Resolution 
The email is sent to the administrative personnel who work within the board 
spaces. The administrative third party is necessary because of the strict prohibition 
between board members and candidates during the promotion board process. The ODC 
information is added to the respective officer’s records housed in the board spaces and is 
used for the duration of the board deliberations. 
In both scenarios, there is a crucial point with regard to record management. 
When the new ODC information is admitted into the board spaces for review during a 
promotion board, regardless of how or why it was admitted, it is only added to the U.S. 
Navy officer’s ODC for the duration of the board, and will not be reflected in the 
officer’s permanent ODC. Because of the nature of record handling during promotion 
boards, information only flows into board spaces. No ODC information leaves the board 
spaces. When new information is admitted to the board, it is only for use in that board 
and is visible only to the members of the board. Additions or corrections to permanent 
ODCs must be routed using conventional processes for adding or correcting ODCs, as 
mentioned in Chapter II. 
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D. CONSTRUCTING THE SCENARIOS 
The two scenarios mentioned in Section C, the addition of missing ODC 
information or the correction of ODC information, represent two useful case studies for 
information flow. This section will explain the scenarios of adding missing ODC 
information and admitting corrected ODC information within the context of U.S. Navy 
officer statutory promotion boards by defining variables and desired outcomes. 
1. Scenarios 
The ODC of a U.S. Navy officer being considered for promotion in a statutory 
promotion board is copied and admitted for the purposes of the board. The ODC 
accurately reflects the contents of underlying the subsidiary information. However, 
assume that a line item within a U.S. Navy officer’s ODC is missing information or has 
incorrect information in it. The associated record from which the ODC line item derives 
is either missing or results in the incorrect information shown on the ODC. This only 
applies to line items that should have previously been correctly documented and does not 
include line items that are intentionally left blank or are not applicable to the officer. 
2. Variables 
 ODC Line Item W – A field within an ODC record for Officer Y that 
reflects Record Information Z. 
 ODC XNEW – A corrected XOLD document. This document houses Record 
Information Z and is reflected in W. 
 ODC XOLD – A document that contains incorrect information or missing 
information. This document either houses an incorrect Record Information 
Z or is missing Record Information Z altogether. 
 U.S. Navy Officer Y – Officer being considered for promotion in a 
statutory promotion board. 
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 Record Information Z – An item of information stored in a record that is 
reflected in Line Item W. 
3. Desired Outcomes 
In both scenarios, ODC XNEW is inserted into officer Y’s OMPF, reflecting the 
current date of addition to the OMPF. Record Information Zi, which is contained within 
XOLD and associated with Y’s ODC Line Item W, is updated reflecting Zi+1, resulting in 
ODC XNEW. In the scenario for the missing record, the OMPF notes that the XNEW was 
added on this date. In the scenario of the incorrect record, the OMPF notes that XNEW was 
admitted with the correct information, replacing ODC XOLD. In both scenarios, the ODC 
XNEW is updated reflecting new information in W, and the underlying records support 
why the ODC XOLD was updated. 
Two additional desired outcomes are also given. Neither are implemented in the 
current process. The first additional desired outcome is that once Zi+1 has been updated in 
W within the board spaces, it should not be necessary for Zi+1 to be updated in W within 
the official database system for Officer Y. This additional desired outcome extends the 
process of adding or correcting records for promotion boards and results in a more 
streamlined process for updating and correcting records. The second additional desired 
outcome is to add a revision number to ODCs. When an update to an ODC XOLD is made, 
a revision number is assigned to Y’s ODC XNEW. This allows for ODC changes to be 
tracked from the original ODC X0, and a forensic chain can be made to reflect all changes 
ever made to Y’s ODC. This would provide greater tracking of the progression and 
change of an ODC throughout a U.S. Navy officer’s career and if needed, would support 
recovery and tracking of the time that a line item may have been corrupted or not 
correctly updated. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter defined two specific scenarios within the vast space of U.S. Navy 
officer record management. The promotion board process is a critical function within the 
U.S. Navy and the U.S. military as a whole. Because governing legislation outlines how 
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its results should be tailored and how it should be conducted, strict adherence to the 
implementation of policy and legislation is needed. Personnel records contain and include 
PII and HIPAA information, both of which must be safeguarded and require access 
control checks in order to be viewed. The records are owned by the CNPC throughout the 
entire process, and the results of a statutory promotion board are also owned by CNPC. 
The information flow process is regulated in a way that maximizes security and privacy 
of information in personnel records. Through the use of the one-way flow of information 
and restricting access to information as ODCs are being created from existing 
information, CNPC maintains the proper ownership and control of information and new 
ODCs created throughout the process of statutory promotion boards. 
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IV. THREAT MODEL 
Threat modeling is an approach for analyzing the security of an application [34]. 
Building a threat model is the process by which security risks associated with a system or 
process can be identified, quantified, and addressed from the perspective of an adversary 
to the system or process [34]. Threat modeling allows the owners of systems and 
processes a systematic and pre-emptive way to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses in 
order to develop mitigations to harden their systems and processes. A threat model for the 
process of admitting missing or incorrect ODC information in statutory promotion boards 
must be defined. Formal threat model construction involves the steps of decomposing 
applications, determining and ranking threats, and determining countermeasures and 
mitigations [34]. We will only construct an informal threat model by defining assets to 
the record handling process for statutory promotion boards and determining threats to the 
assets. 
A. ASSET EVALUATION 
The first step in threat modeling is to identify assets, in this case, those used in 
supporting the process of admitting missing or corrected ODC information during a 
statutory promotion board for U.S. Navy officers. For the purpose of this work, assets 
will be defined as records, systems, and processes associated with the scenarios of 
Chapter III. The protection required for assets will be associated with one or more of 
three security policies: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Each of these 
three policies and the associated assets is assessed in terms of its value to the 
organization. 
1. Confidentiality 
Chapter II outlines the contents of ODCs, and the associated privacy policies and 
restrictions to access. Policies govern the processes for which privacy is maintained for 
record handling. Conservation of the confidentiality of PII, in particular, is of the utmost 
importance, as mandated by HIPAA. Record usage and policy governance outlined in 
Chapter II.A.5 set forth restrictions for safeguarding confidentiality of official record 
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information. These governing policies, therefore, make confidentiality of the board 
process and record handling very important. The OPM data breach is an example of a 
breach of record confidentiality and should act as a warning of the fallout of an attack on 
record confidentiality [35]. 
2. Integrity 
Ensuring the integrity of information in the ODCs of U.S. Navy officers in 
promotion boards is a critical aspect of this thesis. The processes constructed in Chapter 
III are processes that reinstate the integrity of U.S. Navy officers’ ODCs that have lost 
their integrity at some point prior to the convening of the statutory promotion board. 
Integrity is lost when information within ODCs is incorrect or incomplete. The integrity 
of these ODCs has real consequences with regard to manpower and retention of the best 
officers for the U.S. Navy. Manpower is a critical asset of the DoD; therefore, 
maintenance of the integrity of material used in the board process and record handling 
process is critical. 
3. Availability 
For ODCs, availability is not as critical as confidentiality and integrity. The 
availability of records with respect to the promotion board process in an electronic sense 
deals with being able to access records for use in consideration of U.S. Navy officers for 
promotion. While an attack on availability would result in the delay of the overall 
process, physical measures can be taken to mitigate attacks on availability. Thus, it is 
determined that the availability of assets used in the board process and record handling is 
of less concern that confidentiality and integrity. 
B. ADVERSARY EVALUATION 
With the determination of critical assets and the most applicable policies, 
adversaries can be evaluated to determine the most relevant threats to ODCs. Two traits 
will be considered when defining a type of adversary. The first is the adversary’s 
intentions. An adversary is defined as either being intentional or unintentional. An 
intentional adversary is an adversary who acts with the purpose of attacking or tampering 
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with ODCs and the processes used to manage them. An unintentional adversary is one 
who accidentally degrades the integrity or confidentiality of the ODC. While an 
unintentional adversary does not have malicious intent, the unintentional actions can 
result in the degradation of originator control of ODCs.  
The second trait is the adversary’s access point. An adversary is defined as either 
an insider or an outsider. An outsider is an adversary who acts against ODCs by 
penetrating the network space and obtaining access to enterprise systems or data that the 
outsider does not have permission to access. For the purpose of this work, the network 
space is defined as the databases polled for the creation of the ODC, the BUPERS 
database that stores the ODC, and the machines in the board spaces. An insider is an 
adversary who acts against ODCs from inside the network space, and already has 
permissions to access enterprise systems and data. With these traits defined, the four 
types of adversaries can be considered: 
1. Intentional Outsider 
This adversary knowingly acts against the ODC or promotion process from 
outside the defined network space. It is reasonable to assume a highly capable adversary 
is required to obtain access to the databases where subsidiary information for the ODC is 
stored. Therefore, the intentional outsider adversary is considered a threat candidate. 
2. Unintentional Outsider 
This adversary unknowingly acts against the ODC or the promotion process from 
outside the defined network space. Due to the security measures taken on NMCI and the 
internal board spaces network, it is improbable that an adversary could unintentionally 
access the ODCs or the network spaces. Therefore, the unintentional outsider adversary is 
not considered a threat candidate. 
3. Intentional Insider 
This adversary knowingly acts against the ODC or the promotion process from 
inside the defined network space. Even though the defined network space is segmented 
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with restricted access, this adversary has the potential to cause considerable damage. 
Therefore, the intentional insider adversary is considered a threat candidate. 
4. Unintentional Insider 
This adversary unknowingly acts against the ODC or the promotion process from 
inside the defined network space. Record-handling processes are inherently human 
processes that require users to update and maintain record information. It is reasonable to 
assume that mistakes are made in these processes unknowingly. Therefore, the 
unintentional insider adversary is considered a threat candidate. 
C.  MOST RELEVANT THREAT 
, Threats are analyzed considering assets critical to the promotion process and 
ODC and the potential adversaries. With regard to the confidentiality of the board 
process, current processes to safeguard confidentiality are already in place. Enforcement 
of confidentiality of information in the ODC system is achieved through safeguards and 
by applying punitive pressure to personnel to ensure the confidentiality of records. 
Networks with no external communications limit the loss of confidentiality. 
Confidentiality with regard to the scenarios described in Chapter III deals with physical 
processes more than digital processes. Because of the need to enforce policy for ODC 
dissemination control, the confidentiality of ODCs for statutory promotion boards is 
considered. 
We also consider the integrity of the promotion board process and the ODC. On a 
macro level, the promotion board process adheres to the highest standards as it is 
governed by DOPMA, so its integrity is intended to be high. On a micro level, the 
integrity of the ODC is essential to accurately reflect the U.S. Navy officer. The ODC 
represents the work of the U.S. Navy officer, his or her career timeline, and significant 
accomplishments. In order for the promotion board to act with a high level of integrity, 
the ODC must be of high integrity. Therefore, an attack on the integrity is a highly 
relevant threat to the promotion process and ODC. 
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The three types of adversaries are now considered as vectors for carrying out 
attacks on the integrity of the promotion process or ODC. The intentional outsider is an 
adversary who is assumed to be a technically capable and perhaps a nation-state actor. 
The nature of this adversary’s capabilities may allow him or her to covertly corrupt ODC 
documents. Although this is possible, it is unlikely for an adversary to target personnel 
records amidst the large target space within the DoD. This adversary is considered 
dangerous and sophisticated, but because of the unlikely nature of an attack against the 
promotion process and ODCs, the intentional outsider is not considered part of the most 
likely threat. 
The intentional insider is considered the most dangerous adversary with regards to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the ODC. The vetting process for 
personnel who can access records at any given time provides mitigation for this type of 
adversary. Thus, the likelihood of this adversary is very low. However, because of the 
combination of permissioned access and malicious intent, the intentional insider is still 
considered a highly relevant threat. 
The unintentional insider has network access but acts in a way that inadvertently 
leaves the ODC in an incorrect state. Because the policy and procedures for statutory 
promotion boards are not openly documented [33], the discretion given to insiders 
regarding procedures can lead to a breach of the integrity of the promotion process or 
ODC. Given the full range of personnel who can act as unintentional adversaries and the 
access permissions they have, we believe that the unintentional adversary is the most 
likely to corrupt or disclose an ODC.  
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V. ODC ORCON PROCESS MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an Orcon process model for the two 
scenarios introduced in Chapter III. Because BUPERS controls both the contents and 
dissemination of the underlying datastores and the ODC itself, this is an originator 
control problem. The objective is to ensure that there is a log of the reads and writes to 
ODC records starting when they are copied and put into board spaces, through potential 
record correction, and ending at the conclusion of the promotion board. Although it is 
expected that most records do not require correction, the logging system could support 
the correction of any ODC. The methodology used to build the Orcon process model was 
to step through the scenarios constructed in Chapter III and follow the handling of ODCs, 
adhering to the rules necessary to satisfy Orcon conditions. An explanation of the model 
at the critical steps of determination, request, admittance, and resolution is given. These 
steps are defined in detail in Chapter III. 
Following its construction, the Orcon process model can be used as the basis for 
examining how technical mechanisms could be used to support the enforcement of 
policies pertaining to ODCs. The Orcon process model describes the interactions between 
individual users and systems that interact with the records for promotion boards and 
describes how these users will act on the records and derivative objects created from 
these records. Derivative objects are defined as objects that originate from another object 
and include the marked-up documents created by the board members in the reviewing 
spaces. 
A. OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS 
This section provides an overview of the rules and definitions used in this chapter 
for modeling ODC Orcon dissemination control. We first define categories of actors and 
information for the Orcon process model from the perspective of computer access 
control. We then set the rules and define the terms that will be used throughout the 
creation and discussion of the ODC Orcon process model. 
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1. Access Control Overview 
The Orcon process model contains three main constructs: objects, subjects, and 
access modes. Objects are defined as documents or records which are controlled 
according to policy. Objects are created by subjects and can convey access to other 
subjects. Subjects are defined as the execution entities, such as processes, that act on 
behalf of people or organizations. Subjects create, read, write, and delete objects. (Other 
modes of access are combinations of these basic actions.) A subject may control access 
rights of other subjects to objects and may convey control, read, and write access to other 
subjects. ACLs are associated with objects and define the rules for which subjects may 
interact with an object [15]. Because of the compiled nature of documents where 
originator control is in effect, it is possible for multiple subjects to control or have 
differing rights to various information elements contained in an object. Therefore, ACLs 
may reflect a variety of control and access rights. When an object is created, the 
underlying protection system creates its default ACL. The ACL has fields to support 
originator control over dissemination. Originators of objects must maintain control when 
objects are copied, and metadata associated with originator controls must be applied to 
new objects. This allows for originator control over objects created and owned by other 
users. Note that for the purposes of this work, the ACLs created and used are 
hypothesized. We are abstracting the processes of Chapter III and superimposing 
dissemination ACLs based on current practices and procedures. 
2. Rules and Terminology 
Figure 10 illustrates the construction of an object and its metadata, which is the 
foundational building block for the Orcon model for this work. For illustrative purposes, 
the metadata in Figure 10 is partitioned into distinct components. Component A contains 
two elements. The first is the name of the object. The name of the object container 
identifies information and its associated metadata, allowing for the object to be found, 
e.g., via a pathname in a file system. The second element is the owner of the object. Each 
object has exactly one owner. Component B is the usage ACL, which is filled with 
permissions for user interaction with the object. Component C defines the originator 
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retained access control (ORAC) metadata container for the object. Each ORAC metadata 
container defines an originator, and the associated ORAC ACLs created and maintained 
by the originator. 
 
Figure 10. Abstract Object Construction 
Component D shows the ORAC ACLs associated with an object. ORAC ACLs 
have a name, which is associated with an ORAC metadata container (Figure 10, 
Component C), and a list of permissions. ORAC ACLs may be updated, but only by the 
owner of the ORAC ACL subsection. Because the ODC object is a composite object 
containing information from various datastores, the object will use a structured ACL. A 
structured ACL contains the usage ACL and at least one ORAC ACL subsection. Any 
user who has originator control over an entire object or a portion of an object must have a 
subsection of the structured ACL associated with the object. Thus, it is possible for 
multiple ORAC ACL subsections to be associated with an object. The object is then 
limited by the intersection of all ACL subsections, which leads to the most restrictive 
access permission. 
ORAC ACLs consist of access permissions to the object for the subjects acting on 
behalf of users. Usernames are presented in this high-level model to represent users or 
user-groups; however, implementations often choose other representations. Each 
username within an ORAC ACL is assigned up to four distinct modes of access. These 
operation permissions are assigned to specific users, as determined by the originator 
associated with the object’s ORAC ACLs. The four types of operations for ACLs for this 
work are read (R), write (W), append (A), and ownership (O). For the purpose of this 
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work, execution is not considered because the objects involved do not contain executable 
data. Reading allows a subject to view the contents of an object. Reading also allows a 
subject to create a copy of the entire object or a portion of the object. When an object is 
copied, the ORAC ACL subsections are also copied to derivative objects. Writing allows 
a subject to write to an object, and can include additions, deletions, and modifications to 
the contents of an object. Appending allows a subject to add additional content to an 
object. Appending is similar to writing, but it does not allow for deletion or modification 
of the contents of an object. 
The ownership operation allows for the originator of the object to transfer 
ownership to another specified user. Only the originator of an object may assign another 
user or user-group with the ownership mode of access, and does so in the originator’s 
ORAC ACL subsection (Figure 10, Component D). Ownership change occurs when the 
specified user or user-group creates a copy of the object. The copied object’s owner 
(Figure 10, Component A) is the new user or user-group, and the old owner’s ORAC 
ACLs are now owned by the new user or user-group. Ownership of ORAC ACLs can 
only be transferred through the use of the ownership change operation. 
Figure 11 illustrates an example ODC object within the context of the scenarios 
built in Chapter III. Neither the data contained in the object nor the usage ACL are 
relevant to the originator control discussion, so, from this point forward they will not be 
shown in this chapter’s figures. 
In order to accurately read the contents of Figure 11 and future figures, definitions 
are given. 
 Officer is the user ID for the active duty U.S. Navy officer whose ODC 
object is represented in Figure 11. 
 OFFICER ODC is the ODC document associated with user Officer. 
 CNPC is the user ID for the Commander of Navy Personnel Command. 
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 ACL-CNPC is the set of access control rules associated with the 
OFFICER ODC object that reflect the desired access control set forth by 
CNPC. 
 Detail is the user-group ID for the detailers who work under CNPC. 
 Board Member is the user-group ID for the Board Members participating 
in the statutory promotion board process. 
 
Figure 11. Example ACL for ODC Object 
When looking at Figure 11, in combination with the definitions given, the reader 
should gather the following information: 
 The object’s name is OFFICER ODC. 
 User ID CNPC owns OFFICER ODC. 
 CNPC owns an ORAC metadata container on OFFICER ODC with one 
ACL named ACL-CNPC that encompasses the entirety of OFFICER 
ODC. 
 According to ACL-CNPC, user CNPC may read and write to OFFICER 
ODC. 
 According to ACL-CNPC, user Detail may read and append OFFICER 
ODC. 
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 According to ACL-CNPC, user Officer may read OFFICER ODC. 
B. ODC OBJECT CREATION 
CNPC is the authoritative owner of all information within BUPERS databases, 
which includes the ODC. Therefore, CNPC is the owner of OFFICER ODC. To maintain 
the requirements for Orcon, CNPC requires a SAAR-N request to explicitly authorize all 
other users’ accesses to the ODC. Thus, CNPC will either need to explicitly authorize 
access to read, write, or append to the material or will need to grant ownership of the file 
object to another subject in order to maintain the requirements of Orcon. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, an ODC is a data structure comprised of information 
derived from other existing records. The ODC is a snapshot of the most recent records 
maintained by BUPERS. ODCs are generated approximately once per month, and the 
snapshot of the generated ODC is stored until a new ODC is generated the following 
month. Figure 12 illustrates the creation of an ODC through an Orcon process. Figure 12, 
part (a) illustrates the various records that contain information relevant to a U.S. Navy 
officer’s ODC. Each of these records is stored in a database owned by one of the offices 
outlined in Appendix E of NAVPERS 15839I [5]. Each of these various offices is the 
owner of the record before the construction of the ODC. Some of these offices work 
directly for BUPERS, while other Naval offices only report to BUPERS for the purpose 
of supplying necessary records needed to construct ODCs. The ACLs described by these 
records allow the office to read and write to the particular record, but also allow CNPC to 




Figure 12. Creation of ODC Object 
The ODC does not incorporate all of the information contained in the subsidiary 
records. Instead, it retrieves and stores only portions of original records. This process is 
illustrated in Figure 12, part (b) and results in the creation of line items. Only the line 
items necessary for the compilation of an ODC are kept. Line items are owned by the 
individual offices, and the ACLs remain unchanged from Figure 12, part (a). 
Figure 12, part (c) shows an ODC created by BUPERS, which is represented by 
UID CNPC. The structural shell of the ODC document is created by CNPC, and the 
contents of the document are filled according to NAVPERS 15839I [5] and illustrated in 
Figure 1. CNPC creates object OFFICER ODC and is determined to be the originator of 
the object. Information associated with ODC line items is first owned by the various 
offices. In order for CNPC to have complete ownership of the OFFICER ODC object, 
CNPC must obtain ownership of all line items contained in the OFFICER ODC. This step 
is accomplished through CNPC having ownership permission of all LINE ITEM objects. 
When CNPC takes ownership of a LINE ITEM object, ownership changes to CNPC, and 
the ACLs associated with the original owner are also transferred to CNPC. This step is 
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illustrated in Figure 12, part (c) by keeping all ACLs associated with line items attached 
to OFFICER ODC, but reflecting the change of ownership. 
The final step shown in Figure 12 eliminates the redundancy in all of the ACLs 
associated with OFFICER ODC. Since CNPC owns all ACLs associated with the object, 
there is no need for more than one ACL-CNPC. Note that the amount of consolidation 
will be less for documents constructed from information from several Orcon sources. Our 
ODC construction process creates one ACL for all of the information in the object. 
CNPC has read and write permission, and Officer retains the read permission. Detail is 
added to the ACL, since Detail subjects work for CNPC. Detail subjects have read and 
append permission to OFFICER ODC. Figure 12, part (d) shows the final ACL for object 
OFFICER ODC as it would exist under normal conditions in the BUPERS database. 
C. CREATION OF COPIES OF ODC FOR PROMOTION BOARD USE 
The object OFFICER ODC is an object used for statutory promotion boards and is 
used in the scenarios discussed in Chapter III. Figure 13 illustrates the steps taken to 




Figure 13. ODC Object Setup for Board 
The first step in the process of preparing the OFFICER ODC object for use in 
statutory promotion boards is creating a copy of the OFFICER ODC object. This is the 
physical act of copying the ODC object from the BUPERS database and storing it on 
systems in board spaces. Note that the underlying physical process for copying the object 
to board spaces is generating a static PDF file of the most current ODC and putting the 
PDF into the board spaces. It is critical to note that in this step the object is a copy. The 
original object remains in the BUPERS database, while the copy of the object made by 
subject Admin is stored on systems in the board spaces. The result of this step is the 
creation of the copied object, called OFFICER ODC-COPY, for use in board spaces. All 
of the subsequent steps are performed on OFFICER ODC-COPY in the board spaces. 
Subject Admin now adds an ACL to the OFFICER ODC-COPY object. The ACL 
allows CNPC, the owner of the object, read and write permissions. Admin’s ACL also 
gives Admin read and append permission. The unique permission on ACL-Admin that 
does not exist on ACL-CNPC is the read and append permission granted to subject Board 
Member. Figure 13, part (b) illustrates the OFFICER ODC-COPY object after the update 
to ACL-Admin. This is the state of object OFFICER ODC-COPY in the model when 
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Admin has loaded copies of the ODCs from the administrative spaces to the review 
spaces in the promotion board building. This step takes place roughly two weeks before 
the date the statutory promotion board begins its work. 
The final step necessary to prepare the OFFICER ODC-COPY object for use in 
statutory promotion boards is to grant user-group ID Board Member access to the object. 
ACL-Admin gives the necessary permissions to user-group ID Board Member in Figure 
13, part (b), but due to the nature of Orcon, ACL-CNPC must also give permission to 
user-group Board Member. Then user group Admin, on behalf of user CNPC, grants read 
and append permission to user-group Board Member for the purpose of the statutory 
promotion board. ACL-CNPC associated with OFFICER ODC-COPY object is updated 
to reflect this change. This step models approval of a SAAR-N form submitted by each 
board member. Figure 13, part (c) illustrates the state of the ACL for OFFICER ODC-
COPY object when the statutory promotion board convenes. This represents the initial 
state of the object for use in the scenarios built in Chapter III. 
D. MODIFICATION OF ODC WHILE IN USE BY PROMOTION BOARD 
This section describes in detail the steps defined in Chapter III for correcting 
ODC information. Each step is modeled using the rules and terminology defined in this 
chapter to create a detailed ODC Orcon process for the steps required to correct ODC 
information while in use by statutory promotion boards. 
1. Determination of Missing or Incorrect Information 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the two scenarios deal with the requirement that new 
ODC information is submitted for consideration by the statutory promotion board. In this 
section, the problem of missing or incorrect information will be addressed. 
Either a board member or the U.S. Navy officer will determine that ODC 
information is missing or is incorrect, and will initiate the process of admitting new 
information into consideration for the statutory promotion board. Figure 14 illustrates the 
state of the Orcon process model at the point at which this determination is made. Figure 
14 shows the elements required to correct OFFICER ODC-COPY: the record containing 
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the requested ODC information to be added, the current OFFICER ODC-COPY, and the 
corrected OFFICER ODC-COPY. 
 
Figure 14. State of ODC at Determination of Need for Modification 
At this point, OFFICER ODC-COPY is in one of two states: unmodified, or 
previously modified, where modification means a change to or addition of a line item in 
the ODC. In addition, the record could either contain no markups or have markups by 
board members. Recall that the ODC as admitted to the promotion board spaces is a PDF. 
It is not modified. Both markups and modifications are appended to the object. Board 
Members cannot modify the original information in OFFICER ODC-COPY. The steps in 
the ODC modification process are now described in detail. 
2. Request for Records 
In all cases, the requester is the same user who determined that OFFICER ODC-
COPY was incorrect in the determination step. The process for requesting a record for 
admittance in a statutory promotion board starts differently depending on the initiator, but 
the two processes end with the same result. The two request processes are illustrated in 
Figure 15 and 16. The result of the request is an object ready for the admittance step. 
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The physical process for the request of a new record to fill a gap in information or 
replace an incorrect record is given in Chapter III. Figure 15 illustrates the process in 
which Office 1 holds a record to be added to an existing ODC. This flow will represent 
the case where the Administrator copies a record from a database. Figure 16 illustrates 
the process for which an Officer holds information to be admitted. This flow will 
represent the case given in Chapter III, Section C where the officer electronically delivers 
a record to the administrator for admission. 
 
Figure 15. Orcon Process for Request for Record from Office 
In Figure 15, the OFFICER Record X is in a database owned by Office 1. The 
object’s ACLs give Office 1 read and write permissions and Officer read permissions. 
Subject Admin is given read, write, and ownership permission to this object by means of 
subject CNPC, and subject Admin is acting on behalf of subject CNPC when this record 
is copied. This permission escalation is provided as a way for user-group Admin to 
conduct a permissioned action that is pre-approved by user CNPC. This copy of the 
object is stored within the board spaces. User-group Admin adds an ACL to the 
OFFICER Record X object, giving user CNPC read, write, and ownership permissions, 
Admin read and append permissions, and Board Member read and append permissions. 
Admin then exercises the ownership change permission in ACL-Office 1 to take control 
of ACL-Office 1 from Office 1. Admin then removes the original ACL-Office 1 from the 
object, leaving it with only the new ACL-Admin that user group Admin had added to the 
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OFFICER Record X object. Now the record is ready for admittance to the statutory 
promotion board. 
 
Figure 16. Orcon Process for Request of Record from Officer 
Now consider Figure 16. Officer electronically submits a record object for 
admittance. The object’s ACLs give the Officer read permissions, and Admin read, write 
and ownership permissions. Note that this object exists to represent the officer’s 
electronic submission of a copy of the record to the administrators working in the board 
spaces. Admin then exercises the ownership change permission in ACL-Officer to take 
control of ACL-Officer. Then Admin adds an ACL to the OFFICER Record X object, 
giving CNPC read, write, and ownership permissions, Admin read and append 
permissions, and Board Member read and append permissions. Admin then removes the 
original ACL from the OFFICER Record X object, leaving it with only the new ACL that 
Admin had added to the OFFICER Record X object. The record object at this point is 
ready to be admitted to the statutory promotion board. 
The result of the operations in Figure 15 and 16 is a record object that is allowed 
to be admitted into the statutory promotion board. An important distinction to make at 
this point between OFFICER Record X and OFFICER ODC-COPY is that the owner of 
OFFICER Record X is Admin and not CNPC. This distinction establishes the scope for 
which the new record object can be used and reflects its impermanence in the BUPERS 
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record system. This distinction will be further clarified in the resolution step of the 
model. 
3. Admittance of Records 
Figure 17 illustrates the end-state of the metadata after the request and admittance 
steps have been completed. 
 
Figure 17. Corrected State of ODC 
The upper left corner of Figure 17 is the admitted record object that was built 
during the request step. The entire record object is not needed to be admitted to the promotion 
board. Looking back to Figure 12, remember that only the necessary line items from the 
corresponding records are used. The admitted records added to the original board ODC 
object will follow this same principle. The necessary line item is extracted from the record 
object by user-group Admin and appended to the ODC object for use for the remainder of the 
promotion board. When an ODC is corrected during the promotion board process, the same 
admittance steps are used. The newly admitted line item exists in parallel with the incorrect 
line item in OFFICER ODC-COPY, but the newly admitted line item is considered valid 
while the original, incorrect line item is considered invalid. The newly admitted line item 
inherits the ACL associated with the container the ODC exists in. 
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4. Resolution 
The resolution step involves the post-board procedures regarding the ODC object 
for which a line item has been appended as a result of information that was missing or 
incorrect in the original OFFICER ODC object at the time the board convened. 
The OFFICER ODC object was only used in this entire model to act as the point 
of origination for the copy to be made for use in the promotion board. All operations in 
the model are on the OFFICER ODC-COPY object. This results in a corrected OFFICER 
ODC-COPY object, but not in the correction of the original OFFICER ODC object.  
The OFFICER ODC-COPY object is stored locally in the board spaces until the 
results of the board have been disclosed. At this point, OFFICER ODC-COPY is deleted. 
Corrections to OFFICER ODC-COPY will also be lost. For the OFFICER ODC object to 
be updated, the record containing the line item of previously missing or corrected 
information must be submitted for correction through standard processes. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter built an Orcon process model based upon two scenarios constructed 
in Chapter III. Existing physical processes for the admittance of records to statutory 
promotion boards due to missing or incorrect information were described in a logical 
access control model so that computers can be used to support those processes. This 
model reflects a use case with actors who are compliant with all rules and act 
accordingly. Tools, such as blockchain, which are used to build integrity and security in 
an application, may be useful when the threats from Chapter IV are introduced to this 
Orcon process model. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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VI. BLOCKCHAIN USE CASE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to define and analyze a blockchain-based audit 
mechanism to act as a deterrent to the threat modeled in Chapter IV. We believe that an 
audit mechanism for accountability of ODC accesses and modifications would help 
mitigate threats described in Chapter IV. The proposed blockchain audit mechanism is 
based on the underlying transactions being built from access and modification 
transactions on ODC objects. A functional and security analysis will examine the efficacy 
of using a blockchain mechanism to provide auditing to support the ODC Orcon 
dissemination restrictions. The analysis will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
proposed solution for the defined scenarios from a technical point of view and will assess 
whether a blockchain solution would be beneficial within the context of the scenarios and 
Orcon model presented here. 
A. THE VALUE OF AUDITING 
We propose auditing to address the threats introduced by insiders. The threat 
model for this scenario was defined as an insider acting against an ODC, altering its state 
to a state that does not accurately reflect the correct state of the ODC or violating the 
dissemination policies for the ODC. Because the threat is an insider, it is assumed that 
they have authenticated access to the systems on which unauthorized actions are carried 
out. There could be a single incorrect action amidst thousands of correct actions, which 
translates to one incorrect transaction amidst thousands of legitimate transactions. Note 
that the audit mechanism described here only supports audit logging, not audit analysis, 
and an incorrect action is not identified as unauthorized and will not be flagged as 
invalid. The execution of the unauthorized action cannot be prevented. 
A benefit of an audit mechanism is that it is able to deter the insider threat by 
keeping track of all accesses and modifications to ODCs. A central audit server and a 
blockchain audit mechanism are able to create a timestamped and signed audit trail. Audit 
mechanisms offer a forensic audit trail of accesses and modifications to an ODC, from 
the time of its initial creation to the current time. Therefore, the one improper transaction 
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logged can be traced back to the exact time when the action took place, and a user can be 
associated with the specific transaction. Hence, evidence will be available that could be 
used to identify and possibly prosecute the insider. 
Invalid transactions cannot be discovered by audit mechanisms, so the transaction 
must first be discovered by other means. Once it has been discovered, audit mechanisms 
offer enough information to recreate a valid ODC. Compare this to the existing system 
that only stores the current state of the ODC, and does not store previous transactions 
performed on ODCs. The current system is vulnerable to the threat of unauthorized 
modification of the ODC and does not provide a method for restoring the correct state of 
the ODC, other than attempting to piece together a new, correct ODC by hand. Audit 
mechanisms offer a way to restore a previous version of the ODC that the current process 
cannot effectively achieve 
B. BLOCKCHAIN AUDIT MECHANISM  
In this section, the implementation of the audit application will rely on blockchain 
technology. When considering blockchain as an audit mechanism within the context of 
the scenarios defined in Chapter III, multiple approaches can be considered. The 
mechanism can audit who accessed the information, the mode of access to the 
information, the time of access, and the state of an ODC. A blockchain can be used to 
create an audit trail of accesses and modifications to an ODC. It able to store a log of all 
transactions in its associated ledger, and the integrity of the logs can be verified as the 
blockchain grows. Storing the state through modification transactions creates the benefit 
of being able to track all iterations of an ODC object and the users associated with 
individual modifications. 
Revision numbers are an additional desired outcome of Chapter III and can be 
accomplished by binding timestamps with ODC state in the audit trail. The revision 
number desired outcome was determined to benefit in the tracking of ODC state over 
time. By binding timestamps with ODC state in a blockchain audit mechanism, all ODC 
modifications can be tracked sequentially without the need to change the structure or 
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contents of an ODC by including revision numbers, yet still satisfying the outcome of the 
addition of revision numbers. 
Using blockchain technology as an audit mechanism would make it possible to 
provide integrity to the access and modification logs associated with ODCs. If an ODC 
had been disseminated in violation of policy, the blockchain could provide evidence as to 
who may have performed the unauthorized action. The proposed blockchain audit 
mechanism will provide this capability, which can act as a deterrent to the insider threats 
modeled in Chapter IV. The main blockchain components to be used are described 
below. 
1. Type of Blockchain Used 
We must determine if the blockchain should be public or private. The systems in 
use for the Orcon process model have specific access controls and are located in physical 
spaces that require specific authorization for access. In addition, privacy controls protect 
the material being accessed. Thus, a private blockchain appears to be most appropriate. 
The private blockchain for this use case will be owned by CNPC and would give explicit 
permission to users and user-groups to view the blockchain and its contents in accordance 
with privacy rights and ODC policies. 
Next, we must determine whether the proposed blockchain should be 
permissioned or not. The physical process for access to PII held within systems used for 
statutory promotion boards is handled through a SAAR-N, as described in Chapter III. 
This vetting process for access to information is best translated to the proposed 
blockchain application using a permissioned blockchain. For this use case, CNPC gives 
permissions to a user-group of employees who will participate in consensus and create 
blocks. Users and user-groups who wish to create transactions will be granted permission 
by means of official orders or via authenticated access to ODCs or digital ODC resources 
through web interfaces. 
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2. Transactions 
Transactions comprise the data that is recorded in the blocks of a blockchain. 
Thus, an ODC-handling audit transaction must first be defined. In accordance with the 
Orcon process model of Chapter V, users or user-groups will access or modify ODC 
objects. These actions can be translated into one of two transaction types for use in the 
blockchain audit mechanism. 
The first transaction type is an access transaction. This transaction will record the 
users who access an ODC. Not all ODC accesses will be recorded in the ledger, as this 
would clutter the ledger with redundant actions. Instead, access transactions will be added 
to the ledger with a level of granularity that will make each transaction meaningful within 
the context of auditing, while accurately reflecting the ODC access patterns of specific 
users. An access transaction will consist of the user accessing the ODC, the time of the 
access action, and the name of the ODC object being accessed. 
The second transaction type is an ODC modification transaction. All modification 
transactions will be recorded in the ledger. ODC modification transactions consist of the 
time of the modification, the user who performed the modification action, and a snapshot 
of the ODC object after the modification action. These transactions allow tracking of 
changes to ODCs over time and can attribute all modifications to ODCs to specific users. 
This will create an accountability record of users who have modified ODC objects. 
Other special actions to an ODC, such as its creation and its retirement, will also 
be considered transactions that will be recorded in the ledger and blockchain. Users are 
vetted prior to being able to access or modify ODCs, either through a SAAR-N or CAC 
authentication on web interfaces. 
3. Consensus 
The second key feature of a blockchain application is its consensus method. This 
requires two choices. The first is the type of consensus method to be used. The second is 
who can participate in consensus. The second consideration is essential for permissioned 
blockchains.  
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All consensus models require a tradeoff between security and cost. Consider 
proof-of-work. With fewer nodes participating in proof-of-work, the blockchain is less 
secure. The blockchain loses security because malicious nodes may dominate or collude 
to gain control over consensus when fewer total nodes participate in consensus. If 
malicious nodes were able to gain control of consensus, they would be able to determine 
the creation of new blocks and could modify previous blocks, breaking the immutability 
of the blockchain. When many nodes are participating in proof-of-work, the blockchain 
becomes more secure, because malicious nodes have less total influence in consensus. 
However, proof-of-work is expensive at large scales [18] because in proof-of-work, many 
nodes compete to solve a proof puzzle for a block, which results in redundant, 
computationally intensive work. Other blockchain consensus models exist, such as 
practical Byzantine fault tolerance [36]. Each consensus method has its own advantages 
and disadvantages and requires tradeoffs. Determining a consensus model requires 
familiarity with systems and users participating in consensus. 
For the purpose of this work, the actual consensus model will not be discussed, 
because it is not a critical factor in determining the applicability of a blockchain for ODC 
auditing. The decision for a consensus model is left to the implementation of the 
proposed application.  
Not all users generating transactions in a blockchain application must also 
participate in the consensus mechanism required to construct new blocks. This is a 
critical feature in a permissioned blockchain. For the Orcon process model, there are 
regular users and permissioned users within the context of statutory promotion boards. 
CNPC owns the ODC, and would also own the blockchain audit mechanism. CNPC must 
determine a group of users who on its behalf, will participate in consensus for block 
creation. The number of users can be small since the number of transactions in the 
blockchain is small in comparison to popular cryptocurrency applications. The users 
selected to participate in consensus should not have regular access to ODCs, and should 
not be creating transactions. This will allow for the audit mechanism to better act as an 
accountability tool because the users participating in consensus are distinct from those 
who are generating transactions as a result of ODC accesses and modifications. 
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4. Software Suite 
Blockchain technology relies on a software suite to manage the ledger, 
transactions, and consensus. The software suite interacts with the system, the user, and 
the peer-to-peer network that constructs and maintains the blockchain. All systems used 
that fall under the jurisdiction of the Orcon process model of Chapter V will run the 
software and participate in the peer-to-peer network. This software can be interposed 
between user interfaces and software that interacts with ODCs to generate transactions 
from associated actions. 
The Orcon process model built in Chapter V defined specific users and user-
groups who interact with ODC objects during the process of statutory promotion boards. 
For the purpose of statutory promotion boards, user-group Admin can act on behalf of 
user Officer and user-group Board Member for all actions that take place within the board 
spaces. 
C. ANALYSIS OF BLOCKCHAIN APPLICABILITY 
This section will discuss the applicability of the proposed blockchain solution. 
While a blockchain solution cannot ensure the integrity or confidentiality of ODCs, it can 
allow for the recovery from modification errors and can help ensure the integrity of the 
audit record. There are several points in an ODC’s history when auditing is 
recommended. This helps detect and deter unauthorized actions by insiders. The analysis 
examines how the blockchain mechanism meets the desired outcomes of Chapter III and 
the scalability and throughput of a blockchain approach. A comparison of the proposed 
blockchain audit mechanism to traditional auditing performed by a central audit server is 
made, and a recommendation is given regarding the implementation of an audit 
mechanism for use in auditing ODC accesses and modifications. 
1. Desired Outcome Analysis 
Chapter III defined the desired outcomes for the scenarios revolving around the 
ODC. The primary desired outcome from the scenarios was to have the ODC correctly 
updated with corrected information from supporting documents, and for the overarching 
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BUPERS database to reflect the time and detail of the ODC update. Modification 
transactions also include a snapshot of the current ODC. The transaction would contain 
the ODC snapshot post modification. The blockchain audit mechanism is not able to 
verify that the admitted records are correct but does provide the user associated with 
every transaction. Should an ODC be discovered to be incorrect or unauthorized 
disclosure of an ODC occur, this audit mechanism can provide a subset of users who 
accessed or modified a specific ODC as a list of potential suspects who performed the 
unauthorized Action. In the case of Figure 18, Action C shows an error inserted in the 
ODC, and Action E shows unauthorized dissemination. Action E is not recorded in the 
audit trail. The audit mechanism can be used to determine that user Y made the incorrect 
modification, and at least one of the group of users Z who performed Action D 
disseminated the ODC without authorization. 
 
Figure 18. Example Blockchain Audit Mechanism Usage 
Chapter III also defined two additional desired outcomes that are not reflected by 
current processes in the defined scenarios. The first is to have revision numbers added to 
ODC documents, providing a sequential number for an officer’s ODC. The proposed 
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blockchain solution is able to satisfy this additional desired outcome by linking 
timestamps with ODC states, without having to add an actual revision number to the 
ODC document. Whenever a modification is made to an ODC, a modification transaction 
would incorporate a timestamp for the transaction. This can be seen in Figure 18 where 
ODCi is associated with Action A, and ODCi+1 is associated with Action C. This feature 
of the proposed solution creates an additional benefit to the overall ODC management 
process. 
The second additional desired outcome is to allow for modification to the ODC to 
be made during the promotion board process, and have it reflected in both the ODC used 
during the promotion board and the ODC for permanent use within the BUPERS 
database. Recording modifications made during a promotion board as transactions in the 
ledger would allow the local change in the board spaces to be stored in the ledger for the 
ODC. Because transactions only log modifications, the BUPERS database still needs to 
be updated to reflect the change made during the promotion board logged in the audit 
mechanism. The blockchain audit mechanism cannot implement this additional desired 
outcome. 
2. Scalability and Throughput 
The proposed blockchain solution has nodes set up in the peer-to-peer network on 
multiple systems within Naval Personnel Command in Millington, TN. These nodes are 
in communication with each other, sending transactions and blocks between those 
participating in consensus and block creation across the network. This requires a specific 
throughput of information on a consistent basis in order to be able to use the proposed 
solution reliably. One limitation of blockchain solutions is scalability [36]. According to 
the Navy Fact File, there are approximately 54,000 active duty U.S. Navy officers [37]. 
ODCs are updated a minimum of once a month per officer, and the average size of an 
ODC PDF document is assumed to be 90KB. Figure 19 calculates and compares the 
number of transactions and amount of data required for the proposed solution as 
compared to the Bitcoin blockchain. 
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The Bitcoin blockchain stores 93.5 times the number of transactions in half of the 
space as the proposed ODC solution. While this inefficiency would seem to indicate a 
disadvantage in the proposed solution, these are performance estimates, and analysis and 
comparison testing will be needed to assess them for a real system. 
 
Figure 19. ODC versus Bitcoin Throughput Comparison [38] 
3. Comparison 
Finally, the blockchain audit mechanism is compared to a central audit server. 
One of the main benefits of the proposed solution is the handling of concurrent usage of 
systems and creation of transactions. Rather than having all transactions sent to a central 
authority for verification, the proposed solution distributes the transactions across nodes, 
and the permissioned users who participate in consensus have the responsibility of 
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verification. The proposed solution solves the problem of a single point of failure for the 
system of auditing ODC documents. The proposed solution requires information to be 
passed within the peer-to-peer network for transactions, consensus and block formation. 
Testing is needed in order to assess the impact of peer-to-peer communication on 
network performance accurately. The blockchain is also able to provide integrity to the 
logs. When transactions deepen in the blockchain, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
change the transaction. An adversary would have to gain control over enough systems to 
control consensus to change a transaction. With the distributed verification and consensus 
of transactions added by means of a blockchain audit mechanism, a single point of failure 
is eliminated, and the overall system for tracking changes to ODCs becomes more 
resilient and secure. 
A disadvantage of the blockchain approach is the increase in the total amount of 
data stored, as the entire audit log ledger has to be stored on all systems participating in 
consensus and block creation. The blockchain approach would also require acquisition of 
multiple systems to handle the auditing, consensus, and block creation. The cost of 
acquisition and implementation of these systems with respect to time and money would 
have to be analyzed to determine the feasibility of implementation. 
A central server authority solution would handle all transactions to ODC 
documents and record the time-stamped, digitally signed transactions into a single log. 
The central solution would congregate all ODC accesses and modifications into a single 
log stored on the central audit server or stored on another system. The benefits of a 
centralized solution are its ease of implementation and the localization of all audit log 
information. The total storage needed for the central approach would be less than the 
blockchain approach, and cost and time to implement the solution would be less. A 
disadvantage of a central audit server is that if it were to go down, all auditing may be 
lost or halted for the duration of the server downtime. A backup server would be needed 
to provide resiliency. Therefore, the central solution is less costly and simpler, but 
potentially less resilient and secure. 
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4. Recommendation 
The value of auditing has been discussed, and a possible blockchain audit 
mechanism has been described. The proposed blockchain audit has been analyzed against 
the desired outcomes defined in Chapter III, analyzed in its effectiveness in deterring the 
insider threats for ODC accesses and modifications, and compared to the current system 
to which a central audit server is added. This section provides a recommendation for 
existing U.S. Navy personnel record management systems based on the analysis. 
The proposed solution is able to satisfy the required outcomes defined in Chapter 
III and is able to satisfy one of the two additional desired outcomes for managing ODCs. 
Timestamping ODC states in the blockchain helps show the progress of the record as it is 
updated through an officer’s career. The path towards the reduction of redundancy in 
updating incorrect records during statutory promotion boards is also discussed. 
The main advantages of the proposed blockchain audit mechanism are that it 
provides a way to account for insider threats, and it allows for the inclusion of the 
additional desired outcomes defined in Chapter III. Within the context of personnel 
record management of an organization of 54,000 employees, it is reasonable to assume 
the prospect of the mishandling of information from time to time. The proposed solution 
accounts for this happening and provides a way to recover the integrity of an incorrect 
record, and hold accountable users who mishandle sensitive personal record information. 
It does not assure that mistakes will not fall through the cracks but ensures that all errors 
can be associated with a time and a specific subset of users.  
The main disadvantages of the proposed blockchain solution are the scalability of 
the solution and the overhead in implementing the solution on existing systems. Testing 
of implementation of the proposed solution would determine how large the peer-to-peer 
network can get before throughput is affected. No matter the size of the network, 
however, the proposed solution does increase the overall network traffic on the networks 
where the systems reside. Another disadvantage is the time and manpower required to 
implement the proposed solution. It requires that a software suite be installed on all 
participating systems. Any new system in the peer-to-peer network would be required to 
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install the software and download the ledger associated with the blockchain. Another 
disadvantage of the proposed solution is the size of ledger and blockchain over time. The 
ledger will grow over time and is stored locally on systems participating. The ledger and 
blockchain can be archived and reduced in size once deemed too large, keeping the 
memory usage for the online peer-to-peer systems low. 
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed blockchain 
solution in the broader context of the U.S. Navy personnel record management system, 
the proposed solution appears to be overly complicated and impractical at this time, due 
to the need for implementation and testing of the entire system, the increase in data 
storage across all systems storing the blockchain, and the increase in network congestion 
from the peer-to-peer node traffic. Further research is needed to determine if the 
disadvantages of the solution can be mitigated or eliminated. A more practical immediate 
alternative would be to enable timestamped, digitally signed audit logging on a central 
server authority. This would be less cumbersome to implement compared to the 
blockchain solution and would require that only a single system be monitored and 
updated. The alternate method would support the desired outcomes and would integrate 
into existing systems. 
D. SUMMARY 
We discussed the value of auditing in addressing the issues posed by insiders, and 
determined that a blockchain or a central server can be used to audit ODC modifications 
and dissemination control. Using the Orcon process model built in Chapter V, a 
blockchain solution was analyzed as a deterrent to partially mitigate insider threats to the 
confidentiality and integrity of ODCs. While the proposed solution cannot prevent the 
alteration of the ODC, it provides an immutable audit trail of accesses and modifications 
to the ODC and should support the proper recreation of a correct ODC. Advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed blockchain solution were analyzed, and a recommendation 
regarding its pursuit was given: a blockchain is not the best immediate solution to the 
threat posed to the ODC Orcon process model. Advances in blockchain technology could 
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make it a more viable option in the future. A recommended alternative is to enable 
timestamped, digitally signed audit logging on a central server authority. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of this work and to provide 
recommendations for future work based on the findings of this work. 
A. SUMMARY 
This work investigated the policy for accesses, modification and dissemination of 
ODCs, built a model for ODC dissemination during the process of statutory promotion 
boards and provided a potential blockchain audit mechanism that can be used to support 
accountability policy enforcement for personnel record handling within the U.S. Navy. 
This work built a model for ODC dissemination that has not been modeled before. This 
work also demonstrated the criticality of use case studies when researching the usability 
of new technologies. The analysis of the blockchain audit mechanism determined that 
blockchain might be an effective tool to deter potential insider threats. However, we also 
determined that the proposed blockchain solution introduced unnecessary redundancy 
and complexity relative to alternative solutions. 
The ODC Orcon model provides a technical access control model for the 
dissemination control of ODCs during the statutory promotion board process. The ODC 
Orcon process model was based on the compilation of sources and authorities. The model 
also identified improvements to the process of handling the access control of ODCs and 
streamlining the process for record correction. This model can be used in future work on 
ODC dissemination control, record correction procedures, or statutory promotion board 
processes. 
The threat model associated with the Orcon process model was not entirely 
countered by any proposed solutions in this work. The proposed audit mechanism is able 
to account for and act as a tool for assistance in recovery from attacks by insider threats, 
so their implementation to help mitigate the overall threat from this and other adversaries 
should be assessed. 
This work considered the use of blockchain technology for a single use case. Even 
though blockchain technology is not deemed to be the best solution here, it may be well-
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suited for other situations. Blockchain technology is evolving, and its underlying 
processes are still being improved. New developments in blockchain technology could 
mitigate the main disadvantages associated with the use case presented here, and re-
examination of in the future may be prudent. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This section describes the recommendations for possible future work. The two 
recommendations are: further testing of the proposed blockchain solution and future 
blockchain use case studies. 
1. Implementation of Proposed Solution 
This work proposed a blockchain solution for auditing a personnel record 
management process and analyzed it based on the principles of the technology, the 
current processes and systems. The next step in the research of this particular use case 
would be to implement the use case and study the real effects of the solution. The 
implementation could be compared to the findings of this work to determine how the 
solution actually behaves on the discussed systems and networks. This implementation 
would also provide a real use of blockchain technology as an audit mechanism for 
personnel record management. 
2. Additional Use Case Studies 
In the process of building and analyzing the use case presented here, new 
information on processes was learned, technologies were better understood, and 
recommendations could be made to improve processes. A systematic method for creating 
and analyzing use cases for blockchain technology is critical for thoughtful and accurate 
analysis of its value for specific situations. Use case studies should be constructed for 
other scenarios in order to determine critical system or process weaknesses and to further 
our application of the potential uses of blockchain technology within the DoD. 
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